I. Introduction
In the conventional supply-and-demand framework, an increase in the minimum wage reduces employment for those workers with wages at or near the minimum level. Most of the early U.S. and Canadian empirical evidence is consistent with this 'standard prediction' of a negative employment effect (Brown 1988 , Swidinsky 1980 , Schaafsma and Walsh 1983 . In general, aggregate studies using time series data from the 1970s and early 1980s conclude that a 10 percent increase in minimum wage decreases the teenage employment by 1 to 3 percent 1 (Brown 1988) . The validity of the time-series evidence, however, has recently been called into question. A number of studies (Grenier and Séguin 1991 , Wellington 1991 , Card 1992a and 1992b , Katz and Krueger 1992 , Card and Krueger 1994 , Machin and Manning 1994 suggest that the employment effect of the minimum wage is insignificant or perhaps marginally positive 2 .
A number of attempts have been made to bring these divergent results into line.
One strand of the reconciliation examines workers' employment patterns before and after an increase in the minimum wage using individual-level panel data. Linneman (1982) is an early study adopting this approach. More recently, Currie and Fallick (1996) examine increases in the U.S. minimum wage in 1980 and 1981 using this framework. They find that young people who are 'bound' by the two minimum wage changes (i.e., their current wage rate is between the old and new minimum) are 3 percent less likely to be employed in the following year.
Both the Currie and Fallick results and those in Linneman's study have been criticized on the grounds that panel estimates of minimum wage effects are biased due to the lack of a suitable control group. Since the minimum wage in the U.S. is under the jurisdiction of the federal government, all workers in the covered sectors with wage rates near the minimum are affected simultaneously by a change in the legislation. Therefore, there are few candidates to serve as a control for unrelated concurrent changes in labour market outcomes; typically higher wage workers are used as a control group. In other words, the panel results are based on a comparison of 'low wage' and 'high wage' individuals. It is possible therefore, that the panel estimates partly capture any differences in employment stability between the two wage groups. For instance, Card and Krueger (1995a, p. 224) observe:
High-wage workers provide a poor comparison group for studying the employment histories of low-wage workers. The insight from the "natural-experiments" approach to empirical research is that it is crucial to have a control group representing the experiences that the affected group of workers would have had in the absence of the minimum wage increase.
Obtaining an appropriate control group becomes the central challenge for panel studies of minimum wage. Perhaps the most convincing control group that has been used in U.S. studies is low wage workers in the uncovered sectors. For example, Ashenfelter and Card (1981) re-examine Linneman's analysis, comparing low wage workers in the covered sectors to those in uncovered sectors. As reported in Card and Krueger (1995a) , their results indicate that both groups of low wage workers share similar employment experiences following the minimum wage increases in 1974 and 1975 . This suggests that the significant disemployment effect of the minimum wage found in Linneman's study is a result of the heterogeneity between high wage and low wage individuals. Canada, arguably, provides an even better environment in which to address this issue. In contrast to the U.S., the minimum wage in Canada is under provincial jurisdiction. Therefore, for an increase in the minimum wage in a given province, low wage workers in other provinces can serve as the control group. In this case, the minimum wage effect is identified by variation between two groups of low wage individuals with comparable experience.
Using data from the Labour Market Activity Survey, I examine the effects of provincial minimum wage increases in Canada between 1988 and 1990 . Over the sample 2 In addition, Card and Krueger (1995b) argue that the time-series literature is affected by publication bias, leading to a tendency for significant negative results to be over-represented in the published period, there were a total of 19 separate changes in minimum wage across the 10 provinces. I begin by adopting the U.S. panel methodology: that is, including high wage individuals in the control group. Fixed effect estimates of the effect of the minimum wage on employment probability are negative and significant for both teens and young adults.
This result is consistent with other U.S. panel estimates of minimum wage effect. I next replicate the analysis limiting the control group to low wage workers in provinces with no minimum wage change. The resulting estimates of the minimum wage effect are insignificant and virtually zero. The difference in the results across these two methods appears to validate the criticism of past panel studies of minimum wage. The negative and significant estimates from the first method are driven by differences in employment stability between high wage and low wage workers.
A closer examination of the low wage sample, however, indicates that the minimum wage has different impacts within this group of seemingly homogenous workers.
For 'transitory' low wage workers, who have less than 3 quarters of low wage employment over the sample period, the minimum wage effect is small and insignificant.
In contrast, the minimum wage effect is both statistically and economically significant for those with longer low wage employment histories. For these workers with more than 3 quarters of low wage employment, teens are 7 percent less likely to be re-employed after a 8.4 percent increase in the minimum. The impact on young adults is even larger at 10
percent. An account of the difference in the minimum wage effect across these two groups is that most of the 'transitory' low wage workers are either full time students working in low paid summer jobs or 'high wage' workers temporary trapped in low wage positions. Thus, their current wage rates are likely lower than their marginal productivity.
In terms of the target group in a supply-and-demand framework, they are less likely to be affected by the minimum wage.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the key aspects of the longitudinal data set. Since no micro panel study has previously been conducted for Canada, Section 3.1 replicates the U.S. panel studies by including high wage individuals.
In Section 3.2, I limit my sample to only low wage observations in order to determine literature.
whether the results are sensitive to the definition of the control group. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
II. Data
The Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS) is a longitudinal labour market data set which is a representative of the Canadian population 3 . Individuals are initially (1988) sampled through an addendum to the Labour Force Survey. They are then recontacted annually (1989 and 1990 ) and questioned about their labour market behaviour in the intervening period. In addition to general demographic information, the survey contains detailed employment information, such as weekly employment status and the beginning and end dates of different non-employment spells. Since the primary objective of this paper is to retrieve panel estimates of minimum wage effects on youth employment, only people between ages 16 and 24 in 1988 are included in my sample 4 .
The LMAS provides weekly employment status for each individual and it is possible to construct a weekly panel on the labour market activity of each individual every year. However, control variables, such as provincial unemployment rate and consumer price index, are provided at most on a monthly basis, and changes in the main variable of interest, the minimum wage, are even less frequent. I therefore work with a quarterly data which captures each individual's employment status 5 at the middle of each quarter 6 ; that is, at most 12 observations for each individual during the three year sample period. Also, I
exclude any individual who moves to the Yukon and Northwest Territories over the 3 Individuals living in the Yukon and Northwest Territories are not sampled in the LMAS. 4 Because my sample 'ages' over time, these individuals will be 18-26 by the last year of the panel. 5 The LMAS attempts to decompose nonemployment into three states: unemployment with job search, unemployment without job search and not in the labour force. As pointed out by Jones and Riddell (1994) , there are problems with this filter of the data. It may lead to biased measurement of the incidence and duration of nonemployment when there are only two meaningful nonemployment states. However, the LMAS longitudinal file provides a perfect forum for my analysis that only focuses on movements between employment and nonemployment in a two-state framework.
sample period because a complete series of all the control variables is not available for these areas.
I focus on the effect of the minimum wage on the transition from employment to nonemployment. Therefore, I confine my sample to those who are employed with a positive wage rate in a given quarter. In the LMAS, an hourly wage rate may not be directly reported by the individual. Any wage or salary, which is not reported on an hourly basis, is converted to an hourly equivalent rate as the usual wage or salary (e.g. Table 1 . Not surprisingly, the marriage rate and education level of young adults are significantly higher than for teens. Young adults work longer hours at higher wages. The mean wages are 6.78 and 9.22 for the teens and young adults respectively. In addition, the average employment history of young adults is almost half a year longer than for teens. Young adults have 8.4 quarters employed throughout the three year sample period while the mean is only 6.6 for teens. As shown in Figure 1 , the sample distribution of the number of total employment periods for young adults is heavily skewed to the right. As noted above, over the three year sample period, there were 19 minimum wage changes in different provinces. As shown in Figure 2 , there has been at least one minimum wage increase in all provinces, except Manitoba. We might expect the nominal minimum wage to trend upward over the period, as provincial governments may adjust the level in order to match the inflation rate. On the other hand, there is no common pattern in the trends of the relative minimum wage, measured as the ratio of the nominal minimum wage to the average provincial manufacturing wage 8 (MinW/AvgW). This is in part due to the fact that there has been distinct minimum wage policies in the provinces over the period 9 .
As expected, provinces like Ontario and Quebec, which revised their minimum wages yearly during the sample period, have a more stable pattern in the relative minimum wage.
8 It is the provincial average manufacturing wage including overtime.
III. Empirical Framework

The 'Traditional' Approach -All Employed Individuals
If minimum wages and employment are negatively correlated, an increase in minimum wage will increase the likelihood of those currently employed being laid off or unable to find new jobs through regular turnover in the next period. In other words, the probability of shifting from employment to nonemployment increases. Given that an individual is employed in period t-1, the probability of being employed in the next period is modeled as a function of a set of control variables and the variable measuring exposure to the minimum wage increase. 11 There is a difference between my approach and the framework in Currie and Fallick. They compare the 'at risk' individuals to those who are unlikely to be affected by an increase in the minimum wage. As noted above, my comparison is not limited to individuals within the same province who are not likely to be affected, but also uses individuals in other provinces with no minimum wage change. It is possible to replicate the work of Currie and Fallick by estimating equation (1) Table 3 .
A set of estimates of the linear probability model given in equation (1) is reported in Table 4 . Starting with the OLS estimates, the coefficient on AtRisk i,t is negative and statistically significant 12 for both teens and young adults. On average, 'at risk' teenagers are 6.9 percent less likely to be re-employed after a 8.4 percent 13 increase in minimum wage. The impact is even greater on young adults at 14.8 percent 14 .
The OLS estimates are subject to the same criticism leveled at other panel studies of minimum wage. The control group consists primarily of high wage workers. If high wage workers are 'better' than low wage workers in some unobserved quality that has a positive effect on employment and earnings, the results from the OLS estimation are biased. More precisely, the estimates of the minimum wage effects also capture these differences between high and low wage workers. In order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity between the two wage groups, I re-estimate equation (1) The random effect estimates for comparison to the fixed effect estimates are reported in columns 3 and 6. At 5 percent confidence level, the test 17 rejects the hypothesis of no correlation between the individual effects and other regressors for both age groups.
Another point worth mentioning is that the minimum wage effect is always greater for young adults' employment than for teens. This may be due to the fact that current wage rate is a noisy measure of an individual's productivity, especially for teens. Some good quality teenage workers may be 'trapped' in minimum wage jobs because that is where most employment opportunities are (e.g., in the fast food industry). The current wage rates of these teens do not necessarily reflect their potential productivity. On the other hand, given that the average young adult wage is much higher than the teenage average, young adults in the 'at risk' group are more likely to have really poor labour market prospects. Therefore, they may be more 'vulnerable' to the impact of minimum wage 18 .
Based on the results in Table 4 , the conclusion is that the minimum wage has a significant negative effect on the employment probability of the 'at risk' group. After 15 As a result, 1605 observations are dropped from the original sample. 16 The less negative coefficient in FE estimation may also be measurement error which biases the coefficients towards zero. In the LMAS, the wage rate for a particular job is measured annually. Therefore, measurement error may exist in quarterly observations, especially in defining the 'at risk' group. 17 The Hausman test statistics, distributed χ 2 (24), are 622 for teens and 128 for young adults. Both are greater than critical value at 5%. 18 In fact, I have replicated the analysis on adults between the ages of 25 and 34. In this case, the effect of minimum wage on the 'at risk' group is slightly greater than for young adults (age 20-24). The minimum wage effect on re-employment probability ranges from 10 to 12 percent. This further confirms the idea that an individual considered 'at risk' in a group with a higher average wage is more likely to be a lower 'quality' worker.
controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, 'at risk' teens are 6 percent less likely to be employed after a 8.4 percent increase in minimum wage. The impact on young adults employment is even larger at more than 10 percent 19 . These results are consistent with other U.S. panel studies, such as Currie and Fallick (1996) .
Using a similar specification 20 , they find that 'at risk' teenagers are 3 percent less likely to be employed as a result of a 7 percent 21 increase in the U.S. federal minimum wage in 1980 and 1981. Canada would appear to share a comparable experience to the U.S.
More generally, we must be careful comparing this set of results with other minimum wage studies. First, I am focusing on the disemployment effect on the 'at risk' workers who represent a very small portion of the entire youth population. In my sample, 9.5 percent of the teens and 2.4 percent of the young adults are considered 'at risk'.
Therefore, even though an increase in the minimum wage has a negative and significant impact on 'at risk' employment, it is very unlikely to lead to a reduction in overall youth employment. Second, the estimated minimum wage effect only refers to the transition from employment to non-employment. Ideally, I should also look at the transition from non-employment to employment in order to obtain a complete picture of the minimum wage effect on employment probability. However, I cannot use current wage rates to identify the non-employed as 'at risk'.
19 See footnote 14.
20 Instead of the dummy variable 'At Risk', they use a continuous variable WageGap to control for the effect of minimum wage. WageGap i,t is defined as the difference between the minimum wage at t and the wage rate of individual i at t-1 if he is considered as 'at risk' in the minimum wage change at t. WageGp i,t = 0 otherwise. Conceptually, WageGp i,t is just a refinement of AtRisk i,t . WageGp i,t further distinguishes the 'at risk' individuals based on the difference between their current wages and the minimum. I have also replicated the empirical analysis using WageGap. The results (not reported) are robust to this change in specification. The coefficients on WageGap are all significant and negative. For teens, the estimates imply that on average the 'at risk' group is 4 to 5 percent less likely to be employed in the following year if there is a minimum wage increase. The implied effect on young adults is larger at -9 to -11 percent. 21 Currie and Fallick do not report the average percent increase in minimum wage explicitly equal to 7%. From Table 1 in their paper, I calculate the average percent increase in the minimum in 1980 and 1981 weighted by the number of 'bound' individuals in each change.
A Refinement of the Control Group -Only 'Low Wage' Individuals
As noted above, most criticism of the 'traditional' panel model focuses on the definition of the control group. Since the control group in the previous section is dominated by the high wage individuals outside the 'at risk' range [MinW t-1 , MinW t ], the coefficient on AtRisk j i,t not only captures the effect of minimum wages on the re-employment probability, but also any differences in employment stability between low wage and high wage individuals. If high wage workers always have higher employment rates than low wage workers, the estimates of the minimum wage effect in the previous section may be biased away from zero. One way to address this problem is to exploit the panel nature of the data and estimate a FE model, as reported in the previous section. Yet, assuming the individual effects for youth are fixed over time is subject to question. In commenting on Currie and Fallick (1996) 22 , Card and Krueger (1995a, p. 228) An alternative solution to this heterogeneity problem is to obtain a better control group. That is replacing the high wage workers with a group of workers with wage rates comparable to the 'at risk' individuals but who are not affected by the increase in the minimum wage. The comparison group in the analysis of the previous section consists of two different types of people: those outside the 'at risk' range [MinW t-1 , MinW t ] in the province with an increase in the minimum, and all workers in other provinces with no minimum wage change. In this section, I focus on the 'low wage' individuals from the latter group since they are potentially a good control for the 'at risk' individuals. They have similar wages to the 'at risk' workers and therefore are more likely to have similar employment stability. 22 In addition to the basic FE model, they include a dummy variable for workers with wage rates no more than 15 cents above the minimum. Also, they decompose the control into 3 different groups. Their results indicate a negative minimum wage effect even after employed these different treatments for the unobserved heterogeneity.
There are at least three ways to define a control group of low wage workers in a province where there is no change in the minimum wage. First, we could consider a worker as low wage if his wage rate is within a certain fixed dollar interval above the existing minimum in his province. A second definition would be to replace the fixed dollar interval by a fixed percentage interval. By these two definitions, the wage interval is insensitive to the minimum wage changes in other provinces. Therefore, instead of imposing a time invariant margin, a changing interval could be used. and MinW j t-1 + 0.25 when the minimum wage of province j remains unchanged at time t. It is important to note that more than 93 percent of the control group used in the previous section is excluded by this definition 26 . A detailed decomposition of the entire sample is presented in Figure 3 .
Equation (1) is re-estimated using this alternative methodology. The results are presented in Table 5 . Again, I begin with a linear probability model estimated by OLS.
For teens, the estimate of the minimum wage effect is negative, but virtually zero. As well, the standard error is much greater than the estimate. For young adults, the estimate is negative with greater precision and magnitude, but still is not significant even at 10 percent confidence level. Therefore, the OLS evidence would seem to confirm the criticism of previous U.S. panel studies. Once the comparison group is restricted to low Table 5 . 26 As shown in Figure 3 , 60296 are excluded from the control. wage individuals, there is no minimum wage effect on youth employment, even for those 'at risk'.
The purpose of focusing on low wage workers is to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity among workers. The treatment and the control groups are supposed to have comparable employment experience ex ante. Therefore, we would expect the results from a FE model to be very similar to the OLS. Surprisingly however, the FE model provides a very different picture. The results are reported in the second and fifth columns of Table 5 . Here the estimated parameters on AtRisk j i,t are negative and statistically significant for both age groups.
Unless there is a strong reason to believe that individual fixed effects are correlated with changes in the provincial minimum wage, the difference between the OLS and FE estimates cannot be solely explained by unobserved heterogeneity among workers. 27 of the OLS sample is excluded. In order to identify the effects of this sample selection, I present OLS estimates using the FE sample. The results for both age groups, reported in columns 3 and 6, are very similar to the FE estimates: The estimated minimum wage effects are negative and statistically significant. Thus the difference between the FE estimates and the OLS estimates in columns 1 and 4 is due to sample selection rather than heterogeneity. This further supports the argument that low wage workers from provinces with no minimum wage change provide a good control for the 'at risk' individuals.
Because the variation in the minimum wage in the sample is geographical, it would be surprising if it was correlated with individual effects.
27 40.4% of the teens and 39% of the young adults sample are excluded.
The estimates from the different sub-groups of the low wage sample indicate that the minimum wage has a significant effect on individuals with three or more low wage employments (FE sample), but not on the complementary group. This implies that the worker's wage is not a sufficient statistic to identify those who are directly affected by the minimum wage. These groups of low wage individuals differ in two main areas. First, individuals excluded from the FE sample have a shorter average employment history.
Including all low and high wage employments, they are employed for only 5.7 quarters throughout the three year sample period, while the mean in the FE sample is 8.1 quarters.
Second, they appear to be transitory low wage workers. Only one in three of their employments is considered low wage 28 . I next re-examine these excluded individuals to discover how the minimum wage effect is correlated with the number of total employment periods and the percentage of low wage employment. They may be sub-divided into the following two groups:
i) individuals with low wage employments < 3 and total employments < 3
One reason workers will have fewer than three periods of low wage employment is that they are employed in only one or two quarters throughout the entire sample period. A prominent feature of this group is that they have an extremely high job separation rate. On average, given that they are employed in the present period, the probability of being nonemployed in the next period is 70 percent. Considering that my sample only consists of young people between the ages of 16 and 24, there are at least two hypotheses to account for short employment histories combined with high separation rates. One is that this group is comprised of low wage workers with extremely poor labour market prospects. Alternatively, this group could be full time students who only work in low paid jobs during the summer. One way to distinguish these two hypotheses is by looking at the distribution of their employment periods. We would expect the employment of those in the former category to be evenly distributed throughout the sample period, and a strong seasonal pattern for the latter. As shown in Figure 4 , three large spikes occur in the third quarter of each year. This supports the hypothesis that this group of low wage individuals with extremely short employment histories is dominated by summer job workers.
Therefore, an increase in the minimum wage is likely to have little impact on their voluntary summer job separations.
ii) individuals with low wage employments < 3 but total employments ≥ 3
As shown in Figure 3 , most of the individuals excluded from the FE sample have at least three periods of employment, but only one or two of them are considered as low wage.
The distribution of the percentage of low wage employment for these workers is presented in Figure 5 . On average, only 1 in 5 of their employment periods is defined as low wage.
In contrast, individuals in the FE sample have 3 in 5 of their employment periods defined as low wage. Intuitively, the probability of individuals being 'real' low wage workers should be positively correlated with their percentage of low wage employment. If only 1 in 10 of an individual's employment periods is low wage, it is unlikely that he is a 'real low wage worker'. Instead he is likely a high wage worker who works temporarily in some low paid jobs. This suggests that the current wage rate may provide a noisy measure of an individual's permanent marginal product. For example, an individual may be in the low wage group transitorily because of a negative shock to his wage. In addition, a transitory period of low wage employment at the early stage of an individual's employment history may be due to summer jobs. Approximately 50 percent of the low wage employments for this group are in the first two periods of the workers' employment history. As well as having a lower percentage of low wage employment, these workers are also 5 percent less likely to be employed in below minimum wage jobs. Finally, their average earnings in high wage employments are $0.5 higher than in the FE sample. All these observations suggest that the minimum wage might have a smaller impact on this group of effectively 'high wage' individuals.
In summary, this seemingly homogeneous group of low wage workers can be divided into 'transitory' (excluded sample) and 'permanent' (FE sample) low wage
workers. An increase in the minimum wage displays opposite effects on these two groups.
It has significant impact on the 'permanent' low wage workers employment, but is trivial on the 'transitory' individuals. These different results across the groups highlight the importance of carefully defining the target group in a minimum wage study. Most previous studies use current wage rates to identify low wage workers as those who are the most likely affected by the change in minimum wage policy. The preceding analysis
indicates that relying on current wage rates to make the identification may be insufficient.
For individuals who have extremely limited low wage employment histories, current wages may underestimate their marginal products. A close examination of the 'transitory' low wage workers in my sample reveals that they are mainly students working in low paid jobs during the summer, or 'high wage' workers temporarily trapped in low wage positions. In terms of the target group in a supply-and-demand framework, they are less likely to be affected by the minimum wage.
IV. Conclusion
Previous U.S. panel estimates of minimum wage effects have been criticized on the grounds that they are based on comparisons between low wage and high wage workers.
As a result, the estimated disemployment effect may be driven by the difference in employment stability between the two groups. Using Canadian panel data for the period 1988 to 1990, I find some empirical support for this criticism. When high wage workers are included in the control group, changes in the minimum wage has a strong negative impact on low wage employment. This result is consistent with other U.S. panel studies of minimum wage. However, the estimated minimum wage effect becomes insignificant once the control group is limited to low wage workers in provinces with no minimum wage change.
A closer examination of the low wage workers in my sample reveals considerable heterogeneity within this group of individuals. For 'transitory' low wage workers, who have less than 3 quarters of low wage employment throughout the sample period, the effects of the minimum wage are virtually zero. There is a significant disemployment effect, however, for the complementary group. For workers with more than 3 quarters of low wage employment, a minimum wage increase of 8.4 percent leads to a 7 percent decrease in teens' employment. The effect on young adults is even greater at 10 percent.
From a public policy perspective, these results suggest that an increase in the minimum wage is very unlikely to lead to a reduction in overall youth employment level, even for the 'transitory' low wage workers. Yet, it has a significantly negative impact on workers with poor economic prospects. A tradeoff exists between wage level and employment for those who are the primary focus of the minimum wage policy. In order words, when both the treatment and the control groups are defined appropriately, the standard 'textbook prediction' of a negative employment effect can still be retrieved. Notes: See notes in Table 4 . "AtRisk" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is 'at risk', 0 if the individual is considered as low-wage control. N = Number of low-wage employment periods. All standard errors are corected by White (1980) procedure. 
Percentage of Low-wage Employment Periods
Percentage of Individuals
Excluded Sample (K >= 3)
FE Sample
Notes: See notes in Figure 4 .
